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Introduction 
 
It is a commonplace of both political and academic argument that the last quarter of 
twentieth century saw major diminution of national economic policy autonomy, with 
increased capital mobility identified as the key explanatory variable.1  Schor talks of 
the ‘Rise and fall of the national model’,2 and many concur, identifying a decline of 
the doctrines of  ‘Keynesianism’ as synonymous with this declining national 
capacity.3  Thus, for example, Tony Blair noted in his 1995 Mais lecture; ‘We must 
recognise that the UK is situated in the middle of an active global market for capital – 
a market which is less subject to regulation today than for decades. An expansionary 
fiscal or monetary policy that is at odds with other economies in Europe will not be 
sustainable for very long. To that extent the room for manoeuvre of any government 
in Britain is already heavily circumscribed’.4
 
Responding to these widespread ideas about the constraints on national economic 
policy, Cohen identifies the key research agenda to which this article contributes; 
 
The interesting question … is not whether financial globalization imposes a 
constraint on sovereign states; it most clearly does. Rather, we should now be 
asking how the discipline works and under what conditions. What accounts for the 
remaining room for manoeuvre, and why do some countries still enjoy more policy 
autonomy than others?  … It is time to move beyond broad generalizations about 
the logic of the unholy trinity [see below] to more disaggregated analysis of the 
complex linkages between global finance and domestic performance. 5
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The existing literature offers some qualification regarding the strength of the 
constraint along two main lines. Firstly, empirical evidence shows that welfare states 
show no general cutbacks since the sharp increase in capital mobility, only an end of 
expansion.6 Secondly, Mosley7 identifies a narrow focus of financial markets on few 
macro aggregates in advanced capitalist democracies, notably the rate of inflation, 
deficit and debt ratio, in determining government credibility. This focuses our 
attention on the construction of financial credibility as a key issue in determining the 
degree and nature of enduring policy autonomy (or conversely the constraints 
thereon). This in turn draws our gaze to the institutional and ideational context in 
which ‘credibility’ is constructed, and the crucial role of a number of agencies.8
 
Despite such qualification regarding capital mobility impact, the idea of 1970s as a 
watershed for national policy autonomy is still pervasive.9 This article looks at how 
that credibility is constructed in the contemporary period (1997-2003), and goes on to 
analyse the degree of enduring fiscal policy autonomy in two cases – Britain and 
France.10 Our selection of the UK and French cases brings to the fore these clear 
examples of national policy autonomy, and illustrates the different policy autonomy 
implications of choosing fixed or floating exchange rates.  
 
The article is divided into three sections. The first sets out, and critiques, the 
prevailing orthodoxy regarding capital mobility and economic policy autonomy, 
namely the ‘strong’ version of the of the capital mobility hypothesis (CMH). The 
second establishes the ideational and institutional context within which financial 
credibility is constructed with reference to the International Monetary Funds (IMF), 
bond-rating agencies, and the Euro and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The 
third section explores fiscal policymaking autonomy, and the constraints thereupon, in 
the context of increased capital mobility, in Britain and France since the early 1990s. 
 
The Changing International Political Economy and National Policy Autonomy 
 
The scale, instability, and speed of capital flows increased markedly since the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s (see below). This is not to say that capital 
mobility was not a prevalent feature of the international political economy under 
Bretton Woods,11 rather that the scale and nature of mobility has increased very 
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significantly since the 1970s. In the contemporary international political economic 
context, ‘world-wide trading of currencies and government bonds means that 
exchange rates and interest rates, the two critical variables in the formulation of 
national macroeconomic policy, are determined in the context of global financial 
markets’.12
 
Credibility with financial markets has become an inescapable priority for 
macroeconomic policymakers.13 Governments became increasingly convinced of the 
merits of ‘stability’, or low and stable rates of inflation and fiscal discipline, adopting 
restrictive monetary policies in order to avoid incurring a ‘risk premium’ imposed on 
borrowing by investors suspicious of potentially inflationary macro-economic 
stances.14 Capital mobility and financial deregulation changed the cost/benefit 
analysis of macroeconomic strategies.  Yet, whilst it is undoubtedly the case that the 
power balance has shifted in favour of private capital holders, such a disparate and 
diverse group of actors do not ‘impose’ a policy agenda on states. 
 
There was, it should be recalled, more than one route to credibility. Many neo-liberal 
opinion formers strongly favoured floating rather than fixed exchange rates because 
they explicitly rejected the Keynesian Welfare State model that the fixed rate regime 
of embedded liberalism permitted. An alternative, ‘Ordo-liberal’ path to credibility 
could be pursued in the European context, by pegging to the Deutschmark and 
‘importing’ German credibility - often initially at the cost of high interest rate premia, 
and deflationary fiscal policies.15  
 
The ‘Capital Mobility Hypothesis’  
 
The Capital Mobility Hypothesis posits (and, we argue, overstates) a powerful 
constraining effect of financial capital mobility upon macroeconomic policy.16 
Cohen’s ‘unholy trinity’ identifies the intrinsic incompatibility of exchange-rate 
stability, capital mobility, and national policy autonomy.17 With relation to exchange 
rates, one choice facing policymakers is, fixed or floating? Under fixed exchange 
rates, capital mobility increases the efficacy of fiscal policy but eliminates monetary 
policy autonomy, whilst under floating rates, capital mobility renders fiscal policy 
ineffective, but monetary policy can be set independently.18
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 Increasing financial liberalization and deregulation have facilitated capital mobility,  
structurally empowering investors (and particularly large financial institutions) vis-à-
vis governments.19 These empowered actors, Oatley argues ‘prefer low inflation and 
balanced budgets and rapidly shift their funds in response to macroeconomic policies 
that threaten to generate inflation or otherwise reduce the return on investment 
relative to other national markets’.20 The ‘stringent logic’ of the ‘unholy trinity’ 
imposes, according to Cohen ‘an increasingly stark trade-off on policymakers’21 
which allegedly leads governments to eschew expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies in favour of tight money and balanced budgets. 
 
With regard to capital mobility, one putative policy choice is whether or not to 
employ capital controls. Yet in the wake of removal of all capital controls across the 
EU in 1990, resorting to capital controls seems an unlikely (and probably ineffective) 
policy scenario.22 Thus our analysis explores, in the absence of the re-imposition of 
capital controls, how much policy autonomy governments retain in the contemporary 
period.23  
 
As noted above, empirical evidence,24 addressing both the 1980s and the 1990s, 
suggests that the fiscal ‘wiggle room’ or policy space is considerably greater than the 
stark logic of the unholy trinity suggests. The reason the Hypothesis and Trinity may 
be not wrong but overstated relates to the causal mechanisms by which such complex 
processes impact on, or rather interact with states and state actors. The logic of the 
‘Trinity’ is rooted in a ‘textbook’ perfectly integrated open international economy. 
There is evidence that short-term markets exhibit a high degree of integration.25 That 
said, Epstein & Gintis,26 Feldstein & Horioka,27 Epstein,28 and Watson29 all point to 
home bias and limits of flows measured, and lack of profit equalization between 
markets. To the extent that the real conditions that obtain in international financial 
markets diverge from the textbook caricature, we may expect limitations on the 
operation of the constraints the Capital Mobility Hypothesis posits.  
 
Our approach to capital mobility, and its impact on national policy autonomy, takes 
methodological issue with the dominant strand of IPE analysis, which Sinclair terms 
the ‘structural approach’ to international capital mobility, rooted in ‘state-centric 
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ontology of neorealism’.30 These scholars see international capital mobility as purely 
exogenous constraint on states conceived as unitary actors with fixed preferences.31 
Sinclair argues convincingly that ‘Linear structural models of cause and effect 
between ICM and the state are … likely to be inadequate understandings of what is 
really a reciprocal or dialectical process.’32
 
Our analysis involves a number of departures from the ‘structural approach’. Firstly, it 
is important to disaggregate beyond the level of the state. The changing international 
economic context has, Dyson convincingly argues, structurally empowered particular 
groups and constituencies within state elites, notably central bankers and finance 
ministries.33 For example, one reason why EMU in Elie Cohen’s term, set in marble 
the strategy of competitive disinflation,34 was that it bore the imprint the 
‘conservative liberal’ French financial elite of the Trésor and the Banque de France, 
empowered within the French state by the EMS, and then the ERM.35  
 
Secondly, attention must be paid to this institutional and ideological context within 
which the constraint it imposes on states is constructed. The role of key international 
institutions (such as Bond Rating Agencies and the IMF) needs to be addressed in 
shaping the preferences and understandings of economic rectitude that prevail within 
the international political economy.  
 
Thirdly, the ideational level must be afforded due weight in analysis. Structuralist and 
exclusively material accounts miss the role of ideational factors in shaping economic 
policy rectitude, neglecting what Dyson has termed ‘the underlying importance of 
ideas as real phenomena and of their internalisation by domestic elites …[which] … 
underlines the complex interweaving and mutual interdependence between the 
material and the ideational.’36 As Keynes pointed out in an early constructivist 
approach to financial credibility in financial markets, with his beauty contest analogy, 
markets are often less interested in the economic fundamentals than in other actors’ 
(not necessarily exhaustively well informed) perceptions. Focusing on this ideational 
level requires taking account of the interaction of agency and structure. Structuralist 
accounts within the CMH framework neglect the role of agency of governments, 
Treasuries, and financial elites within the core executive in the process of the 
construction of economic rectitude (demonstrated in the empirical sections below). 
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 The mobility of different forms of financial capital has different implications for 
policy autonomy. For example, Mosley’s analysis of the policy consequences of 
deregulated bond markets has unearthed that, as far as developed economies are 
concerned, only specific indicators are of interest to key market actors, leaving 
extensive latitude to governments in how they deliver on these indictors, and 
furthermore to pursue policies which do not adversely effect the key indicators. 37 
Inflation is a pressing concern, and to a lesser extent budget deficits, although ‘the 
influence of financial markets on government policy is much stronger on the 
monetary policy side than on the fiscal policy side’.38 Little else is affording 
significant attention, and quantitative analysis unearthed a surprisingly small impact 
on risk premia of sizeable shifts in budget balance.39
 
The Contemporary IPE and The Institutional Context of Policy Autonomy 
 
This more fine-grained analysis of how capital mobility operates, its interaction with 
states and domestic policy actors, and what institutions shape its impact, is necessary 
to unearth how financial credibility is constructed. The following sections briefly 
establish key elements of the ideational and institutional context within which fiscal 
policy rectitude is constructed for advanced economies. 
 
The IMF 
 
In the period between the foundation of the IMF and the breakdown of the fixed 
exchange rate system in the early 1970s, the financial credibility of national 
governments was closely tied to the role of the IMF. As scale of private lending 
activity increased, and the role of private credit-creating bodies has expanded,40 this 
has become much less true. The IMF continues to perform the surveillance function 
laid down in the 1978 rewriting of Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, gathering 
large amounts of data and regularly publishing its opinion of the economic policy 
rectitude of governments. This remains a significant contributory factor to the 
intellectual climate of opinion, but in the absence of the leverage it enjoyed as a 
lender, IMF influence on economic policymaking within advanced capitalist 
democracies is greatly reduced.  
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 The economic context of the climate of opinion has seen some quite dramatic shifts in 
very recent times. For the last three decades of the twentieth century fears of inflation 
dominated financial markets and much government economic thinking. Such fears 
formed a crucial element of the context in which economic policy was discussed.  
 
By 2002 concerns about deflation, especially in Japan and China, led to the setting-up 
of an IMF task force.41 This stressed the conjunction of declines in global equity 
markets, excess capacity in many industries, slow economic recovery, geopolitical 
uncertainties and higher oil prices as evidence of how deflationary pressures might 
emerge. Whilst noting that the danger of a global deflation was small, nevertheless, 
the IMF warned of the potential difficulties of a falling price level, the need to prevent 
any such deflation before it occurred, and the desirability of constructing unorthodox 
policy responses if the threat strengthened. Although the deflationary threat has 
abated, very low inflation itself involves a strikingly different economic environment 
from that prevailing since the 1970s, not least because of the associated very low 
interest rates. Such rates mean that government debt burdens are much reduced, and 
worries about fiscal unsustainability, so prevalent up to the 1990s, no longer look 
plausible. In turn, much of the edifice set up to constrain fiscal ‘irresponsibility’ of 
national governments seems anachronistic. This highlights the contingency and 
context-specificity of financial credibility which is much underplayed in many 
accounts focusing on neo-liberal policy constraints ‘imposed’ by financial markets.42
 
Bond Rating Agencies 
 
In the wake of the internationalisation of capital markets in the contemporary period, 
as the scale of private lending activity increased,43 the views of the major bond rating 
agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poors, on the creditworthiness of governments 
became much more significant as capital markets grew more important as sources of 
financing relative to traditional bank loans.44 These agencies, in rating sovereign 
bonds, became an important indicator of the credibility of government economic 
policies, and play a key role in inducing confidence regarding borrowing governments 
in these disintermediated international capital markets. 
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The apparent objective, scientific nature of the rating process is spurious. Analysis is 
both quantitative and qualitative, and is bound up with prior assumptions about 
economic rectitude, and thus involves value judgements. A particular paradigm, 
strongly influenced by new classical macroeconomics and the political economy of 
the neo-liberal New Right, prevails. The bond rating agencies peculiarly influential 
position within the international political economy has contributed to the 
dissemination of this world view and its emergence as a policy orthodoxy. Sinclair 
situates this ratings process within a wider ‘construction’ of ‘deficit discourse’ 
involving particular notions of fiscal rectitude.45
 
No doubt partly because of the low inflation and low interest rate international 
political economic context, the shifts in the relative importance of actors involved in 
the construction of rectitude does not appear to have reduced policy autonomy. These 
institutions have not been a source of fiscal policy constraint in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Whatever these agencies misgivings about fiscal prudence in UK and 
France, they have deemed both governments as wholly creditworthy throughout the 
period under discussion here, with Moody’s assigning both country’s long term 
sovereign bonds a rating AAA since the early 1990s.46
 
The Institutions of European Economic and Monetary Integration. 
 
Of primary importance in shaping credibility in the contemporary European context is 
the process of European monetary integration, and the political economic paradigm 
which has underpinned it.47 As noted above, a particular set of core executive elites of 
the key countries (notably central bankers and finance ministry technocrats) were 
structurally empowered in the process of constructing EMU.48 The imprint of this 
empowering of technocrats in finance ministries and central banks can clearly be seen 
in the neo-liberal sound money and finance orthodoxy that shaped the paradigm 
within which EMU was conceived, developed, and implemented. The influence of 
this particular political economic paradigm also ‘fed through’ into governments’ 
credibility bolstering fiscal policy-making rule-making, firstly in the Maastricht 
convergence criteria, and subsequently the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
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This illustrates the interaction between capital markets and state actors. The 
relationship between policy elites, the institutional parameters noted above and 
financial market actors engaged in the construction of economic rectitude is a 
complex and reciprocal one. Mosley notes that the Maastricht criteria became widely 
used by global bond market participants as a metric of financial credibility. Financial 
elites within the core executives of the EMU participating countries were thus 
engaged in the construction of the yardsticks by which their fiscal rectitude would be 
judged, notably by specifying an ‘appropriate’ level of deficit at 3 per cent.49
 
As Dyson notes, ‘EMU involves powerful changes to material realities … the form 
and impact of these effects is also shaped by ideas and their discursive 
construction’.50 In this sense, states, and state actors, and their interactions with 
financial markets, were constitutive of financial market policy constraints. 
Significantly,  ‘governments that adhered to the rules quickly gained credibility with 
financial markets’.51 Thus advanced industrial economies are judged in global bond 
markets by a narrow set of rules, which, under certain conditions, governments are 
able to set.52
 
Financial Credibility and the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
For members of the Eurozone the SGP involves legally enforceable constraints on 
fiscal policies, which largely supplant the constraints maintained by financial markets 
and international financial organisations in the previous decades. The very existence 
of the SGP reflects worries that within monetary union individual national 
governments would face looser constraints, potentially leading to spillover effects 
from national policies to the wider Eurozone.53 How far this has a significant impact 
on national governments depends both on the rules of the SGP and the extent to which 
governments are persuaded/coerced into compliance.  
 
To limit ‘bad behaviour’ by national governments the EU pursued a number of 
policies. One was to legislate a ’no bail-out’ rule, so that financial institutions lending 
to individual governments would not be misled into believing that such lending would 
be guaranteed by the Union as a whole. Second, there are limits on bank holding of 
government debt to prevent excessive monetising of the debt and the risk that 
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excessive borrowing could threaten the stability of financial institutions.54 Finally, 
there is the SGP with its rules about the fiscal policies of individual governments, 
backed by sanctions.55 The SGP, agreed after fraught political negotiation, reflected 
the German-led insistence on a tough regime, so that in addition to a re-assertion of 
the 3 per cent and 60 per cent ceilings, a medium-term aim of a budget ‘close to 
balance or in surplus’ was inserted. As part of the Pact governments have to submit an 
annual stability programme. Only in exceptional circumstances (defined in terms of 
depth of a recession) will deficits be allowed to exceed 3 per cent.  
 
Deficits fell most sharply in the run-up to 1999, and signalled the political 
commitment of governments to accept the very rough and ready targets of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP and bear this cost of the Euro. The recent arguments 
about the crudity of the SGP should not blind us to the fact that fiscal discipline was 
asserted very successfully in the 1990s, and in that context current differences appear 
so far at least quite marginal.56
 
While almost all commentators have accepted the need for fiscal discipline, some 
questioned the desirability of any rules at all, while others questioned the particular 
rules applied. Although Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty specified analysis of the 
role of public investment within the deficit, and the taking into account of the 
economic cycle, and the medium term budgetary position, these precisions have been 
largely forgotten.57 The crude deficit rule made no allowance for the state of the 
economic cycle, nor the fact that most countries started with significant structural 
deficits (i.e. deficits not caused by the cycle). The debt rule did not address under 
what conditions debt becomes unsustainable.58 In fact the deficit rule would not be 
very restrictive in the medium term if we make a simple comparison with long-run 
fiscal policy.59 Only rarely have governments run deficits of more than 3 per cent-
suggesting such a rule does not involve a tightening of rules enforced by previous 
institutional arrangements, though changing underlying conditions make such 
comparisons complex.60  Had the Euro had been launched at a time when structural 
budgets were in balance, or had a period of faster growth preceded the 2002 
slowdown, the 3 per cent rule would probably not have caused difficulties. 
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Slow growth of the Euro area since 2001, exacerbated by the slow response of the 
ECB to the slowdown, forced fiscal policy into a more expansionary form.61 The 
ECB’s policy record has been unaccommodating, and betrays its excessively 
inflation-oriented agenda, reflecting the sound money and finance agenda instilled in 
the foundations and architecture of EMU,62 despite the brief emergence of 
deflationary fears detailed above.63 In 2002 warnings were issued to Germany and 
Portugal, and later France about excessive deficits. This created a political crisis for 
the EU, not least because of the founding assumption of the SGP that the Germans 
would be the model of fiscal rectitude.64   
 
This narrative about the SGP emphasizes how contingent on political and economic 
circumstances its terms have been. More significantly, it does not seem that SGP has 
made any major difference to the capacity of national governments to conduct their 
own fiscal policies. Analysing budgetary policy pursued in the Eurozone period 1997-
2002, Mathieu & Sterdyniak conclude that the Commission’s infrastructure for 
enforcing the SGP ‘seems to have had almost no impact on national policies’.65 
Contrary to Commission desire for balance, the structural budget deficit (not 
including debt servicing costs) grew by 1.2 per cent of GDP between 1997 and 2002. 
The Eurozone public deficit in 2002 was 2.3 per cent (not the 0.3 per cent of the 2001 
Stability Plan). No fewer than Nine Euro countries are set to miss the 2004 target for 
budgetary equilibrium, despite the Commission’s exhortations. 
 
French Fiscal policy 
 
Increasing financial liberalization and deregulation facilitating capital mobility 
allegedly leads Governments to eschew expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in 
favour of tight money and balanced budgets.66 Yet the degree of constraint and 
starkness of policy trade-offs posited by CMH scholarship outlined above are difficult 
to reconcile with the recent history of French fiscal policymaking. 
 
In the early 1990s, as recession took hold, Bérégovoy’s Government pursued a bold, 
countercyclical, expansionary fiscal policy in 1992, justified in Keynesian terms of 
the need to counter the demand squeeze. This must also be situated in its appropriate 
electoral context. The Socialist Government was trying, unsuccessfully, to stave of a 
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crushing defeat, punishment for its having overseen inexorably rising unemployment, 
and a growth in inequality, in the post-1983 U-turn period.67
  
This countercyclical fiscal stimulus, in combination with a deepening recession, led to 
a decisive breaching of the Maastricht 3 per cent public deficit criteria. Peaking at 5.6 
per cent in 1993, France remained in breach until 1998.68 As slow growth, 
compounded by the need to steer a path consistent with the Maastricht convergence 
criteria continued to exert pressure on the public finances, fiscal policy became more 
restrictive. The public deficit was progressively reduced, between 1995 and 1997 as 
the 3 per cent reference value for the budget deficit became a key policy concern. 
Austerity measures and fiscal tightening brought the deficit down, according to 
official figures, to 3.1 per cent in 1997.69  
 
Meeting, or just missing (depending on which figures you trust), the 3 per cent 
reference target in time for accession to EMU involved some creative accounting. 
This illustrates the socially mediated nature of economic credibility, and the role that 
states, and in particular Finance Ministries, can play in constructing their own fiscal 
rectitude. The French state agreed to take over the future pension obligations of 
France Télécom’s in return for a payment of 45 billion francs to the French state.70 
This enabled the French state to massage downwards its public deficit figure, 
bolstering perceptions of soundness whilst not improving the ‘economic 
fundamentals’ upon which those perceptions were supposedly based. 
 
French public finances subsequently improved considerably in no small part as a 
result of the economic upswing between 1997 and 2000. The extent to which French 
fiscal policy was directed at the Jospin Government’s employment and redistributive 
priorities illustrates the existence of the room to manoeuvre. Targeted redistributive 
measures gave an expansionary boost to purchasing power in the French economy. 
From 1999 onwards, public spending accelerated and budgets became more 
redistributive.71 This, combined with redistribution to lower income brackets with a 
higher propensity to spend, kept demand buoyant during the growth period. 
Purchasing power as a proportion of household revenue increased by 16 per cent 
between 1997 and 2002 (the largest 5 year increase in over 20 years).72 There has 
been continuity in the role and importance of automatic stabilizers within the French 
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fiscal policy framework, though both the recession of the early 1990s, and the 
downturn which followed a decade later.  
 
The considerable degree of policy autonomy in both decisions appears considerable 
and gives the lie to the supposed tight constraints in the context of capital mobility. 
Indeed, the critique of the SGP that it takes no account of the economic cycle is 
double-edged. Some point to a lack of symmetry in the SGP arrangements which 
leave governments excessively unconstrained during economic upswings.73 In 2000, 
the Jospin government embarked on the biggest tax cut in 20 years.74 Given the 
subsequent worsening of the economic climate and the public finances between 2001 
and 2003, many retrospectively criticised the Jospin government for being excessively 
profligate with its cagnotte (tax windfall), using it to cut taxes rather than repay more 
debt.  
 
The Jospin Government reduced its debt burden due to lower interest rates, not debt 
reduction. Indeed, debt levels were rising in this period. In the last decade, although 
dipping as a result of the upswing just below 57 per cent of GDP in 2001, French 
public debt has increased substantially, with Government forecasts predicting 65.6 per 
cent of GDP for 2005.75 Although a considerable burden, the costs of debt would 
have been more punitive in the absence of EMU, with investor confidence in the 
advent of the Euro reducing interest rate risk premia in the mid-to-late 1990s.76 
Further ‘wiggle room’ was afforded by the specific context of the restructuring of 
French capitalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s.77 Given the draw on the public 
purse of debt servicing, (attempted) deficit reduction, and tax cuts, receipts from the 
Government’s privatisations programme provided a valuable source of income – (50 
billion francs per year between 1997 and 1999), which also helped contribute to social 
spending priorities.  
 
Room to manoeuvre is further provided by the role governments and Finance 
ministries play in constructing the narrative of their own fiscal rectitude.  Specifically, 
they are able to exploit the inherent inaccuracy of economic forecasting to present 
deficit reduction forecasts, and prognoses of future debt levels, in an unrealistically 
positive light. This further illustrates the role that states and Finance Ministries play in 
constructing their own economic rectitude, and perceptions thereof. The SGP-
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stipulated Stability Plans explain how, over four years, the public deficit will 
approach equilibrium. Even annual forecasts are always inaccurate, given this time 
horizon, governments are tempted to make over-optimistic growth predictions (since 
under-optimistic ones are equally flawed), which would, in a relatively painless way, 
deliver the budget balance.  
 
French policymakers, it seems, value the room to manoeuvre that can be gained from 
the role they play in the construction of perceptions of their economic rectitude. This 
is amply demonstrated in the French stability plan for 2005 to 2007.78 All forecasting 
is based on two predicted growth levels (2.5 per cent and 3 per cent), the former, 
characterised as ‘prudent’ in the document, is still rather optimistic.79 These 
documents play a legitimising role, containing solemn, if often vague pledges 
prudence and belt tightening, whilst retaining planned tax cuts. French budgetary 
policy in 2003 was less restrictive than their stability plan,80 and this is by no means 
an exception. These are an exercise in reframing perceptions to legitimise government 
policy, speaking the language of fiscal austerity, whilst using the opportunity to create 
more room to manoeuvre.  
 
If and when real growth parts from the optimistic prediction, do governments engage 
in restrictive budgetary policy and further stifle weak growth? Or do they allow the 
Budget deficit to grow? Evidence from France between 2001 and 2004 suggests the 
latter is at least as viable an option as the former without incurring punishment from 
financial markets. Despite Commission rebukes of excessively expansionary fiscal 
policy, and reaffirmations of the 3 per cent rule,81 France’s September 2002 SGP 
stability plan, and Budget plans for 2003 (based on extremely optimistic growth 
forecasts), did not conform to the budget balance requirements by 2004, nor even by 
2006.82  France thus remained an ‘unrepentant sinner’.83  
 
Perceived absence of tight constraint becomes most evident at crucial moments in the 
electoral cycle. No doubt as a result of the electoral cycle, in 2002, budgetary policies 
were sharply expansionary, as spending increased by almost 3 per cent in volume, and 
taxes were significantly reduced.84 The more expansionary fiscal policy pursued in 
France, and its impact on internal demand, in part explains the hitherto superior 
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growth performance of France compared to the Eurozone as a whole –in both 
upswing and downswing phases. 
 
Whilst on the spending side, the electoral cycle doubtless provided some impetus for 
the expansion, its impact has been still more dramatic on the receipts side. Many saw 
the Jospin Government’s tax cuts outlined above as an electoralist stunt, driven at 
least in part by a partially populist logic, given the ‘war chest’ provided by economic 
growth, and the proximity of decisive elections.85 Yet this example pales into 
insignificance when compared to the tax promises made by Chirac, in a considerably 
worse economic climate, in the context of the 2002 elections. A centre-piece of 
Chirac’s campaign was a 5 percent income tax reduction pledge. The rhetoric of 
Chirac’s campaign emphasised expansionary domestic policies, and chose to draw a 
veil over European constraints that these policies blatantly flouted (an approach which 
had served him well in his 1995 presidential campaign). 
 
Excessively optimistic (3 per cent growth) forecasting allowed Chirac to promise the 
reduction of income taxes by a third by 2007. This was also the date by which he 
pledged domestically to achieve budget balance (in March 2002, Chirac was still 
telling the Commission and European partners that balance would be achieved in 
2004). Unsurprisingly, Chirac and the Raffarin Government called for a ‘softening’ of 
the SGP in the summer of 2003, yet Government did not abandon plans of a 3 per cent 
income tax cut.86 A combative Commission initiated Excessive Deficit Procedures 
against France in May 2003.  
 
The ‘freezing’ of the Excessive Deficit Procedures, against the wishes of the 
Commission and a number of Euro member countries, in the wake of the Ecofin 
meeting of November 24th-25th provoked an open crisis of the SGP. Interestingly, the 
impact on the financial markets of this open crisis of the institutional framework of 
EMU, which the newly appointed governor of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet warned 
was a grave danger for the credibility of the Euro, was negligeable. Indeed, the 
collapse of SGP coincided with the highest ever value of Euro to dollar, at the end of 
a 16 per cent appreciation in 2003. Indicating actors on financial markets continue to 
have confidence, long term interest rates. Long-term French sovereign bond rates rose 
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slightly from 4.33 to 4.4487 – but this was simply a fluctuation, and there is no 
indication of any discernable effect on costs of borrowing.88
 
Contradicting Pedro Solbes, Finance Minister Francis Mer insisted that the ‘spirit of 
the Pact’ was still being respected,89 and in this he has some justification – notably 
the pledge to reduce deficits below 3 per cent by 2005 (in September 2003, French 
officials had been angling for 2006). That said, French Government predictions of a 
2.9 per cent deficit in 2005 were again based on optimistic growth forecasts,90 more 
sober forecasters put the likely figure at 3.4 per cent.91
 
French economic policymakers attitudes to European constraint appear schizophrenic. 
The 2003 budget explicitly rejected the Commission’s target of budget balance by 
2004, and indeed 2006.92 Its budget for 2004 contained further tax cut promises 
which, once again, flouted commitments made to European Partners (this time at the 
Stresa Econfin meeting) that the deficit would be brought below 3 per cent by 2005. 
That said, the shift to a more restrictive path (a shift further emphasised in the wake of 
European disputes in late 2003), was in part a reflection of a concern to keep within 
striking distance of SGP reference points. 
 
France’s more austerity-oriented fiscal policies in 2003 and 2004 (including increased 
social charges to more than offset tax cuts, and plans to cut certain social 
programmes, notably health insurance), in the context of weak growth, risks 
establishing vicious circle whereby, the more growth is dampened down by restrictive 
budgetary polices, the more austerity will be needed to tackle the public deficit and 
try and rein it in under 3 per cent.93 A recent IMF report endorsed this view, warning 
against ‘rigid adherence to annual deficit targets [which] can impart a procyclical bias 
to fiscal policy through contractionary measures to buttress revenues in a 
downswing’, and has argued that binding rules which ‘allow cyclical revenue 
fluctuations to be reflected in annual outcomes for the budget balance … would not 
sacrifice—and perhaps it would even enhance—policy credibility.’94 The IMF raise 
long term concerns about fiscal sustainability with relation to pension and health 
policy reform in particular, but in the short term are content to endorse the ‘full play 
being given to automatic fiscal stabilizers’ in contributing to recovery. 95
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Ironically, although conditions should permit a return to growth around 3 per cent in 
2004-5, which would enable France to meet its commitments undertaken at Ecofin in 
November 2003, the likely fly in the ointment is a more restrictive budgetary stance 
since 2003 dampening demand and consumption, hampering growth. Despite 
government predictions of a 3.6 per cent deficit in 2004, other estimates put the figure 
at between 3.9 per cent and 4.2 per cent as a result of weaker growth.96  
 
British fiscal policy 
 
Britain was ahead of France in the pace of financial liberalization, with exchange 
controls abolished in 1979 and the opening up of the City of London to much greater 
competition in the 1980s. Yet despite substantial institutional and political differences 
between the two countries, the same broad theme may be repeated: despite this 
liberalization the British authorities have been able to maintain a substantial degree of 
fiscal policy autonomy. 
 The debacle of Britain’s exit from the ERM in 1992 was followed by an 
attempt to establish a new monetary regime by the specification of an inflation target 
(2.5 per cent) and the creation of much greater transparency in the conduct of 
monetary policy. This latter involved the introduction of a regular Inflation Report 
spelling out the basis of policy monetary judgements and the use of ‘seven wise men ‘ 
to give independent policy advice.97 This attempt to reconstruct monetary credibility 
initially went along with extraordinarily large fiscal deficits. From surpluses in the 
fiscal years 1988/9 and 1989/90, the recession of the early 1990s saw deficits in both 
1992/3 and 1993/4 of 7.8 per cent of GDP-higher even than the alleged ‘annus 
horribilis’ of 1975/6 when the figure was 7.1 per cent.98 Unlike in 1975/6, however, 
these deficits did not have disastrous effects on confidence. The initial departure from 
the ERM saw a substantial fall in the exchange rate, but this then stabilised until the 
end of 1994, to be followed by a 6 per cent fall between January and April 1995. 
Similarly, widening differentials in interest rates with the US and West Germany only 
appeared from 1994.99 Hence through the peak of the deficits the government was not 
under great pressure for their reduction. Partly this was because from 1993 the 
government was imposing very large tax increases to try and get the deficit down; 
indeed, the two budgets of 1993 together imposed the biggest ever peacetime tax 
hikes in British history. But perhaps most important was the fact that inflation 
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remained strikingly low in the early 1990s; at its lowest point it was under 2 per cent 
in 1993.100 Also of help was the fact that the debt/GDP ratio, though rising, was well 
inside the Maastricht 60 per cent figure, running between 40-50 per cent at its peak. 
 The Conservative government of the mid-1990s had a proclaimed objective to 
eliminate public borrowing entirely, though in fact it remained in deficit until it lost 
office in 1997. However, there was a notable fiscal tightening in the mid- 1990s, so 
that even allowing for the economic recovery, the fall in the PSBR was very sharp, to 
1.2 per cent of GDP in 1997/8.101
 These policies have of course been conducted against the background of a  
floating exchange rate since the ERM debacle of 1992. Under the Conservatives the 
Maastricht fiscal criteria were officially deployed as benchmarks for policy, but 
without any commitment to the idea that this was paving the way for Britain to enter 
the projected single currency. By contrast, the Labour government elected in 1997 
committed itself ‘in principle’ to Euro membership, but in practice this remained a 
distant prospect.  Though Britain is therefore not a signatory to the SGP, Labour’s 
commitment to eventual Euro entry has led to a clear statement of adherence to the 
principles of the Pact, and its use as one, though by no means the only, benchmark in 
discussions of UK fiscal policy.102  
 A major reason for continuing British wariness about Euro entry was the 
buoyancy of the British economy through the 1990s, with a long upswing in activity 
after 1992, with only minor interruptions at the end of the 1990s. This upswing, as 
noted above, allowed a sharp reduction in fiscal deficits from the mid-1990s, albeit in 
combination with tight controls over expenditure.  
 Initially these tight controls were maintained by the Blair government, one 
consequence of the re-assessment Labour’s macroeconomic policies had been subject 
to in the long years in opposition between 1979 and 1997. The broad thinking behind 
New Labour’s approach was spelt out succinctly by a key adviser in Labour’s 
Treasury team.103 At the core of his argument was the belief that ‘credibility is the 
elusive elixir of modern macroeconomics’, a belief founded not only on developments 
in economic theory in the 1980s and 1990s, but also on the manifest failure of the 
previous Labour government to maintain such credibility in the mid 1970s. Bringing 
together structural and political elements, Balls argued that: ‘The rapid globalization 
of the world economy has made achieving credibility rather more than less important, 
particularly for an incoming left-of centre government which has been out of power 
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for two decades’.104 Ruling out what was seen as the previous errors of fixed and 
intermediate policy rules (e.g money supply or exchange rate targets), Balls argued 
that what was needed was ‘stability through constrained discretion’.  In practice this 
meant a strategy of establishing a track record on stability which would, after a 
period, give the government room for short-run manoeuvre. 
 After its election the Blair government Labour government sought to secure 
this credibility for its macroeconomic policies by two key policies: granting the Bank 
of England independence in the conduct of monetary policy, coupled to a 
commitment to fiscal prudence. Independence for the Bank of England had in fact 
been discussed in government circles as far back as 1988, when the Conservative 
Nigel Lawson was Chancellor.105 But for a Labour government to grant such 
independence marked a decisive conversion both to the priority of low inflation as a 
policy objective and more broadly the logic of credibility as the defining issue. Under 
the new arrangements a Monetary Policy Committee dominated by the Bank would 
set interest rates, on the basis of minuted discussions which after a short lag would be 
in the public domain. The aim of policy would be to achieve the existing target of 2.5 
per cent inflation, albeit this would now be ‘symmetrical’ ie the figure should not be 
allowed substantially below nor substantially above this figure.106  
The principles of fiscal prudence were spelt out in 1998, with two key rules 
enunciated.107 The first, the ‘golden rule’, stated that the government would, over the 
cycle, borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending. The second, the 
‘sustainable investment rule’, said that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP 
would be held stable, and would normally be less than 40 per cent over the cycle. 
 These rules differed from those of the SGP. The first rule was less restrictive 
than the SGP’s commitment to overall budgetary balance or surplus, in part because 
of the British backlog of public investment, which had been low since the 1970s and 
significantly below Eurozone levels at the turn of the century.108 The second rule also 
allowed scope for some expansion of public investment as long as debt did not rise 
sharply. British debt levels were in any event well below the SGP’s 60 per cent 
maximum, at around 35-40 per cent at the turn of the century depending upon the 
precise mode of calculation. Finally, the British rules, by emphasising the need for 
assessment over the cycle, reflected British recognition of the exceptional severity of 
the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s, and the consequent desire to let 
automatic stabilisers do their work. The British rules should not be seen as in any 
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simple sense ‘slacker’ than the SGP, rather it could be said that they reflected a 
similar commitment to fiscal prudence but in the context of a different national 
history. This history, contrary to common perceptions, has seen more budget 
surpluses in the UK than in any other major western economy since 1970 109 - but 
surpluses seen to have been bought at too high a price in cyclical instability. 
 In its first period in office after 1997, the Labour government accompanied 
this prudent fiscal framework with tight limits on public spending growth. However, 
from 1999, and especially after the second election victory of 2001, the government 
launched an ambitious spending programme, focused on health, education and 
infrastructure. The timing of this programme broadly coincided with the deterioration 
of the international economic environment, hence the characterisation of this period of 
policy as ‘unintended Keynesianism’.110 By allowing the deficit to increase the 
government facilitated a milder slow down in activity than was experienced in most 
Western economies. This policy was in line with the commitment to allow the 
automatic stabilizers to be effective. 
 The combination of rising spending (including financing the invasion of Iraq) 
and slowing growth brought the government’s fiscal ‘prudence’ under strain in 2003. 
Where in the run up to the budget of 2002 a current budget deficit of £5.7bn had been 
predicted for fiscal 2002/03, the outturn was a deficit of  £11.7bn.111 The government 
argued that over half of this deterioration was due to the workings of the automatic 
stabilizers, and having generated large surpluses from 1999 onwards, it was still on 
target to return to surplus in 2005/6 and have a current balance over the cycle.112 By 
the time of the 2004 budget the fiscal balance had further deteriorated, with a deficit 
in 2003/4 of £37.5bn, equivalent to 3.4 per cent of GDP.113
 The government argues that the projected pattern is still ‘consistent with the 
Government’s prudent interpretation of the SGP’.114 This is based on forecast data, 
which suggest that, on the Pact definitions, the budget deficit will have peaked at a 
cyclically-adjusted 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2003/4, with a small rise in the debt ratio to 
around 36.5 per cent by 2008/9.115 However, some authoritative doubts have been 
expressed about these projections, not in the current cycle, but the next one. The 
government’s projections, it is argued, depend upon a higher rate of economic growth 
than is plausible, and therefore tax increases may be required to achieve the fiscal 
targets.116
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While some members of Ecofin have expressed doubts about UK policy, in general its 
fiscal rules have been seen as broadly in line with the SGP, but with a recognition of 
the importance of viewing policy over the cycle. Such assessments of the UK are 
partly underpinned by the recognition that, unlike several members of the Eurozone, 
Britain’s debt ratio (having fallen from the late 1990s) is even on pessimistic 
projections likely to rise to levels a long way below the SGP criteria. Indeed, the 
general point can be made that the SGP criteria are much more of an issue for some 
members of the Eurozone than for three of the EU non-members (Britain, Denmark 
and Sweden): ‘Trois des meilleurs eleves de l’EU ne sont pas dans le zone euro…’.117  
New Labour’s macroeconomic policy can be seen as a success in its own 
terms. As one commentator described the strategy: ‘What he (Gordon Brown) really 
wanted was to be in a position where a Labour Chancellor could comfortably borrow 
£20 billion a year for public spending without being accused of profligacy and 
irresponsibility’.118 This has been done with only minor discomfort.  While 
accusations of profligacy have indeed come, as might be expected, from political 
opponents, they have not come with any seriousness from financial markets. In 
consequence New Labour has been able to pursue a ‘Keynesian’ policy based on 
expanding public spending on health and education on a very large scale during an 
economic slowdown. 
 Allowing such a deterioration in the fiscal position has been represented as ‘a 
gamble’ by some commentators,119 but there is little evidence of loss of credibility. 
Partly this is because the growth of the economy in 2003 and after has matched the 
Treasury’s forecasts, despite many commentators in 2003 saying these were over-
optimistic. In addition, the policies pursued have the broad endorsement of the IMF. 
The Fund’s 2004 country report showed some concern at how far the budget deficit 
was really as cyclical as the Treasury claimed, and therefore looked for a somewhat 
faster fall in the deficit in future years. But in broad terms both monetary and fiscal 
policy were seen as appropriate.120  
 
Rules, Credibility, and Policy Space 
 
Thus in both our cases, in different ways, policy elites have established tough rules to 
build credibility, then used the policy space so created to pursue policies which might 
otherwise be unsustainable. New Labour’s policies in power have followed the 
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prospectus laid out by Balls in 1998: establish tough rules to build credibility, then 
use the policy space so created to pursue policies which might otherwise be 
unsustainable.121 However it has not all gone entirely to plan. The initial fiscal 
prudence of 1997-9 proved more difficult to reverse than expected, so that for the 
whole period 1998-2002 public spending and public investment as a share of GDP 
were below the levels of the government’s Conservative predecessor.122 Then, when 
the big public spending increases did start coming through they coincided with a 
slowdown in the economy, so that the fiscal balance deteriorated much further than 
had been anticipated. In response, the government has stuck to its expansionary 
spending policies, though with substantial slowdowns in the rate of growth proposed 
for the years after the end of fiscal 2004/5.123
 
In relation to the SGP, (in part as a result of the lesser degree of interpretive flexibility 
inherent in the original rules) French policymakers have also begun to engage in a 
degree of revision of those rules, again without any demonstrable adverse effects on 
credibility. Dyson has characterised the SGP as ‘tightened fiscal discipline’, 
‘monitoring of convergence programmes’, and ‘hard’ coordination with sanctions in 
the background’.124 However, after November 2003, this last point requires 
qualification. This episode also illustrates the enduring relevance of states (and 
governments within them) as agents in determining the degree of soft-ness or 
hardness of fiscal policy co-ordination.  
 
The virtues of sound money and sound public finances remain a priority – but they 
have been set in the context of other priorities, and the potential for conflicts and 
trade-offs between them has been recognised as has the need to allow the free play of 
automatic stabilizers, without straitjackets of tight, deficit rules insensitive to the 
economic cycle, or economic circumstances. Credibility could be retained whilst 
breaching (for ‘sound’ economic reasons given the economic conjuncture) the rules. 
There was nevertheless a desire to retain the rules as reference points and medium 
term objectives. The shift can be explained with reference to the different ideational 
and political economic context in which this re-evaluation took place. The harsh fiscal 
consolidation in the mid 1990s was successful in achieving low interest rates and 
credibility in the eyes of bond and currency market operators. 
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So solid have been the neo-liberal sound money and finance foundations of the EMU 
project, and the prevalent perceptions arising from them, that French and German 
governments in particular have been able to attenuate, indeed neglect, budgetary 
rigour within the policy mix, without any resultant ebbing away of the confidence and 
credibility (and lower interest rates). Even the shift from ‘hard’ co-ordination 
involving fines and penalties, to an altogether ‘softer’ regime in the wake of the 
Ecofin agreement to halt excessive deficit procedures against France and Germany, 
has not as yet demonstrably damaged the credibility of French government bonds with 
financial markets.125 Whilst untrammelled fiscal recidivism would doubtless damage 
the credibility of the Euro, with impacts on currency and bond markets, clearly the 
judgement of actors in financial markets suggests that SGP effective collapse, and 
France enduring (although, more recently, curtailed) ‘unrepentant sinner’ status has 
not brought us close to that threshold. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The CMH depicts a world of deregulated global finance and eroded autonomous fiscal 
‘policy space’.  The empirical evidence drawn from our cases suggests that this view 
requires significant qualification, and that governments enjoy a good deal more fiscal 
policy  ‘wiggle room’ than the CMH suggests. Our selection of the UK and French 
cases has illustrated the experience of both fixed and floating exchange rates.  
Theoretically, very different kinds of policy autonomy should ensue.  Significantly, 
both cases illustrate substantial degrees of policy autonomy, and offer evidence fiscal 
wiggle room both within and outside fixed exchange rate regimes, thus confounding 
the predictions of open economy macroeconomics (assuming perfect capital 
mobility). These findings are based on just two cases, and the time period under 
consideration was, for the most part, an economic upswing. This clearly limit the 
generalisability of findings, but nevertheless the picture which emerges from detailed 
empirical analysis contrast starkly with the predictions of the Capital Mobility 
Hypothesis. Our evidence suggests little or no sign of significant budget deficits and 
expansionary fiscal policies in Britain and France incurring penalties from anxious 
financial market actors. 
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CMH scholarship tends to underplay interaction, and the ways in which a range of 
international and supranational institutions mediate market forces, as indeed do 
national political authority structures. The importance of the ideational dimension has 
also been insisted upon here. Economic rectitude is more politically and economically 
contingent than the inexorable logic of the unholy trinity suggests. In this deeply 
political process, actors are able to shape the room to manoeuvre to a considerable 
degree.  
 
Furthermore, the recent shift to a more restrictive fiscal policy stance in France has 
not been driven by the inexorable logic of the unholy trinity. If the constraints do bite 
harder, (and the current and planned French macro policy stance suggest they may), 
the explanation is to be found in the political and institutional configuration of the 
Eurozone’s institutional infrastructure and rules. Future developments depend much 
more on the internal politics of the Eurozone and the stand-off between Commission 
and member states (and more specifically on the reworking of the SGP) than on levels 
of international capital mobility and changes thereto.  
 
Fiscal policy rectitude is at least in part constructed by actors (notably central bankers 
and Finance ministries), and not exclusively a tale of exogenous structural constraints 
(although these constraining material conditions clearly play their part). As a result, 
these goal posts can shift to some degree. The role of agency of governments, 
Treasuries, and financial elites within the core executive in the process of the 
construction of economic rectitude, and shaping the yardsticks by which their 
credibility levels are judged, has been illustrated with relation to the Maastricht 
criteria and SGP.  
 
On a broader canvas, British and French Governments’ macroeconomic strategies can 
be seen as powerful illustration of the continuing room for manoeuvre for national 
governments (even Centre-Left governments) in a world of capital mobility. As 
always, the size of this room is partly a matter of contingency. The not-wholly- 
explained continuation of world-wide low inflation has undoubtedly favoured the 
government’s position. But a considerable part of what has occurred must be put 
down to a well-crafted strategy of recognising the concessions that have to be made to 
sustain financial credibility, while also seeing that these concessions by no means rule 
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out the pursuit of quite traditional social democratic goals of counter-cyclical policy 
to achieve fuller employment and significantly higher spending on core public 
services.    
 
What emerges from the preceding analysis is the context dependency of fiscal and 
economic policy credibility. In the contemporary context of low inflation, and low 
interest rates, government debt burdens are much reduced. The worries about fiscal 
unsustainability, so prevalent up to the 1990s, no longer look plausible. In turn, much 
of the edifice set up to constrain fiscal ‘irresponsibility’ of national governments 
seems anachronistic. Overall, it does not seem that SGP has made a huge difference to 
the capacity of national governments to conduct their own fiscal policies. 
Considerable policy discretion endures, and there is little evidence of government’s 
who exploit this policy space losing credibility with financial market actors and being 
punished accordingly.  
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